(1997). Significant redefinitions: A meta‐analysis of aspects of recent developments in initial teacher education in England and Wales. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 102-118. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.1997.tb00023.x.

This article was first published in 1982 in Educational Analysis (4, 75–91) and republished in 1998 (Hirst, P. H., & White, P. (Eds.), Philosophy of education: Major themes in the analytic tradition, Vol. 1, Philosophy and education, Part 1, pp. 61–78. London: Routledge). I was then a lecturer in philosophy of education at Sheffield University teaching the subject to Master’s students on both full- and part-time programmes. My first degree was in philosophy, read under D. W. Hamlyn and David Cooper (...) and, given their interests, inevitably emphasized the philosophy of language, in particular the work of Wittgenstein in this field. When I subsequently turned my attention to the philosophy of education it seemed obvious to me that there were serious problems with Professor Peters’ approach to language, and I had particular difficulties with his approach to criteria, meaning theory and what seemed an odd interpretation of a transcendental argument. This article thus set out to show that the then dominant form of philosophy of education seemed not to take account of developments in the philosophy of language that preceded Professor Peters’ early work by at least a decade and which cast serious doubt on the enterprise as it was then understood. As the articles in the 1998 collection indicate, I was not alone in thinking there was something amiss, although at the time I seemed to be ploughing a somewhat lonely furrow. In revisiting this early article some 30 years after it was first published I have found to my surprise that there is little I would now change, although I have been forcibly reminded of the very lively discussions Professor Peters and I had over these issues. The fact that there is little I would now add to, or subtract from, my critique is in itself a telling comment on the enduring and influential legacy of the approach to the philosophy of education that Professor Peters championed so powerfully. (shrink)

Science studies not only material entities and phenomena, but their reflections in the minds of men, in the form of sensations, perceptions, concepts, and the like. The study of a phenomenon like language involves simultaneous examinations of material entities and the aspect of language which pertains to meaning, which takes shape as a result of man's reflection in cognition of the world around him.

Notions of purity, perfection, or immaculateness have powered our imagination over the ages. Various images of perfection have held sway in their hallowed times, providing secure streams for channelling human energy. Unfortunately, with the unfolding of the human drama on the world stage, all the images of perfection have suffered damage, epoch on epoch. Different responses have emerged to attempt a restoration. Revival of some of the old images is one such response. Production of new images to serve as worthwhile (...) anchors of value and meaning is another common response. For reasons possibly known only to philosophers and historians, the enterprise called modern science has got thickly embroiled in this civilisational process--first, as the culprit behind the decline of some of the established images, then as the producer of new images, and now, perhaps, as a constant reminder of the perpetual lack of purity and immaculateness in all things human. (shrink)

Mill is neither an act-utilitarian nor a rule-utilitarian. Although he professes to regard “utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions”, he in fact makes no appeal to it in determining in Utilitarianism what actions are “of more absolute obligation than any others”. Nor does he appeal to it in his arguments for the two main conclusions of his essay, On Liberty.

I shall unfold Kant’s views on three topics. Kant holds that knowledge of anything’s existence is obtained only by existential judgments. He distinguishes several respects in which the predicate of such a judgment differs from other predicates. In the light of these, Kant sets forth what is required for verifying existential judgments.